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Abstract
It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are comple-
mentary both in the sense that when more decisions are delegated to
a lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be made
of incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incen-
tives should be accompanied by more delegation. This issue is analyzed
within a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisions
to be made: an eﬀort decision which can only be made by the Agent,
and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal
(i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within this
framework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarily
complementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized when
incentives are introduced.
∗I wish to thank Bengt Holmstrøm and Thomas Sjøstrøm for helpful conversations. Er-
rors are, of course, mine.
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2Introduction
How to allocate decision rights and how to establish incentives within an
organization are interdependent choices, and it may be natural to suppose that
when one delegates decision rights to a lower level of a hierarchy, one should
also apply more high-powered incentive schemes at that level. Conversely, it
seems plausible that more high-powered incentives should be accompanied by
more delegation. In the words of Milgrom and Roberts ([16], p. 549):
‘The point that a manager with broader authority should be given
stronger incentives is an application of the incentive intensity prin-
ciple. For example, a division manager who controls sales and mar-
keting as well as production has more ways available in which to
improve unit performance and can be profitably given more intense
incentives. The relationship, however, is one of complementarity
so the reverse implication also holds: the greater be the manager’s
financial incentives, the greater the proper scope of the manager’s
authority’.
However, as will be argued in this article, the claim that delegation and
incentives go together is not universally true. This article analyzes the relation-
ship between delegation and incentives in the simplest possible Principal-Agent
setting by assuming that, apart from the eﬀort choice a, there is one other de-
cision, p, that may be made by either the Principal (the case of centralization)
or by the Agent (the case of delegation). When p is centralized, the problem
is one of two-sided moral hazard, since both the Principal and the Agent will
then make decisions that influence the outcome, whereas when p is delegated,
the problem is one of one-sided moral hazard. Assuming there is only one
performance measure, x, (such as profits) to control both actions, the question
to be analyzed is when rewarding the Agent more strongly as a function of x,
should be accompanied by centralization or delegation of p.
To be able to derive explicit analytical results, a specific counter-example
to the general claim of complementarity will be analyzed. Thus, it will be
assumed that the assumptions of the Milgrom-Holmstrøm model of (linear)
performance pay apply, and it will be assumed that p concerns the riskiness
of projects undertaken by the Agent. Given these assumptions, the model
will be used to analyze whether more high powered incentives call for delega-
tion or centralization of project choice, when the Principal and the Agent’s
3risk preferences diﬀer and when projects diﬀer in terms of risk and expected
return. While the analysis will hence be concerned with a specific example,
it will become clear from the analysis that the example reveals a more gen-
eral pattern. Hence, analyzing the example will reveal an interrelationship
between delegation and incentives, based on the following three realizations:
First, that externalities arise both under delegation and centralization, since
both the manager (the Agent) and the owner (the Principal) will tend to ex-
ercise authority over p in self-interested fashion, without taking the other’s
interest fully into account. Second, that both these externalities may be exac-
erbated by more high-powered incentives (the Agent may e.g. be reluctant to
accept a high-powered incentive scheme, when he knows that his performance
can be influenced by decisions made by the Principal), and which of the two
externalities is more exacerbated may determine whether delegation or central-
ization should accompany higher powered incentives. And third, that which
externality is more aggravated by high-powered incentives may depend on the
parameters of the situation. These three insights will structure the analysis of
the example below.
While the model will analyze a particular counter-example, it is worth
stressing that the non-complementarity applies to a broad set of circumstances.
Take, for example, the situation where the owner (the majority shareholder)
of a company introduces an incentive system that links the manager’s pay to
the stock-value of the firm. It is possible to point to several kinds of decisions
that should then, under certain circumstances, be centralized. This may e.g.
be the case for the decision concerning the amount of resources invested into
an ongoing project, since if the manager controls the flow of resources into a
project, he may be able to hide the fact that the project is not performing,
while if the owner is in control, the outcome of the project may be more
informative of the quality of the manager’s eﬀort. In other words, delegating
the control of resources may lower the informativeness of the performance
measure1. As another example, it may be naturally be worth centralizing
decisions concerning accounting practices when incentives are strenghtened.
Obviously, when a manager’s salary is highly dependent on the market value
of a company, his incentive to manipulate financial accounts may be strong.
These examples illustrate diﬀerent reasons why delegation and incentives
1The idea is that this problem may become larger when incentives become more high-
powered.
4may not be complementary. In the example to be analyzed in the model, the
lack of complementarity arises even though the performance measure (profits)
reflects all which the owner is assumed to care about. Thus, the problem will
arise not because the performance measure excludes one or more of the owner’s
concerns, but because risk preferences diﬀer. In the example concerning re-
sources invested into projects, the lack of complementarity is a consequence of
the fact, well known from the theory of moral hazard, that the eﬃciency of an
incentive scheme depends on the informativeness of the signal of eﬀort; since
it is hard to generalize about when a signal will be more or less informative,
one should not expect a general and robust relationship of complementarity
between delegation and incentives. And in the final example, the problem is
that the performance measure does not adequately reflect all of the owner’s
concerns, and that the delegated decision may then be more distorted, the
more the manager’s pay is related to the performance measure. The distortion
is of course extreme in the case where the performance measure itself can be
manipulated, but the problem may arise also in a less extreme form, as in the
example which Milgrom and Roberts invoke to illustrate the complementarity
of delegation and incentives (as quoted above): if the salary of the manager
of the sales and marketing division is tied to stock-market performance in the
relatively short run, it is clear that he may attempt to inflate the current stock
price through aggressive marketing or sales-eﬀorts, assuming that the stock-
market does not have enough information to evaluate the adverse long run
eﬀects on the firm’s reputation (and hence the adverse long-run eﬀects on the
stock-price). The more high-powered the incentive scheme, the more central
management may therefore insist on having the right to e.g. choose between
new sales-campaigns.
Eﬀects of the kind just mentioned are of course not new to the incentive
literature, and the contribution of this paper lies not in pointing to these eﬀects
but in analyzing the issue of the relationship between delegation and incentives
in the simplest possible setting.
To review the literature on delegation and incentives, it is worth distin-
guishing two strands. One that concerns the (pure) theory of delegation and
incentives, and another that analyzes concrete real world situations, where
questions concerning delegation and incentives arise.
One of the questions analyzed in the theory of delegation is what the in-
herent advantages and disadvantages are of delegation. A fundamental answer
to this question is that delegation makes better use of local information, but
5incurs a control loss relative to centralization (see e.g. Melumad, Mookherjee
and Reichelstein [12])2. Thus, this answer relies on the existence of asymmet-
ric or local information. In contrast, the present article will assume that the
Principal and the Agent are equally informed about all factors relevant to the
situation (with the exception that the decisions may be unobservable), and
it may be worth explaining that this assumption is not based on a view that
the basic rationale of delegation just mentioned is incorrect. Clearly, how in-
formation is distributed between e.g. central and local management is often
of crucial concern for who should make a given decision. However, this paper
focuses on the relationship between delegation and incentives per se, and the
(simplifying) assumption of symmetric information is made both in order to
study this relationship in isolation and for the sake of simplicity.
Another issue addressed in the theory of delegation is when it is possible,
through design of contracts and mechanisms, to achieve outcomes that are
optimal (in a second-best sense, i.e. relative to the information structure).
For example, Melumad and Reichelstein [13] analyze when delegation incurs
a control loss. They show that under certain idealized conditions there is no
control loss: The main diﬀerence to this paper is that Melumad and Reichel-
stein assume the decision p to be contractible both in the sense that P can
commit to a choice of p, and in the sense that under delegation, the Agent’s
incentive scheme can be made contingent on the Agent’s choice of p. Given this
assumption, they can show that there may be no advantage to centralizing p:
the incentive scheme may be made to punish any deviation from the optimal
choice of p by simply penalising it. In the model of the present paper, since p
is not verifiable, the incentive scheme cannot depend on it3.
In the same vein, Gupta and Romano [6], David, Perez and Stadler [20]
and Demski and Sappington [4] analyze how the problem of double moral
hazard may be solved through clever mechanism design, when both a and p are
unverifiable. However, the mechanisms suggested rely on certain assumptions
that will not be made in the present paper. For example, Gupta and Romano
2Another aspect is analyzed by Aghion and Tirole [1], who stress the eﬀect of delegation
on incentives to acquire information concerning projects’ viability. The literature on strategic
delegation, e.g. Melumad and Mookherjee [11], should also be mentioned.
3Lal [10] studies whether pricing decisions can be delegated to the salesforce and shows,
like Melumad and Reichelstein, that if the incentive scheme can be made contingent on
the choice of p (the pricing decision), delegation may do as well as centralization, but that
delegation may do better if the sales agent is better informed.
6and David, Perez and Stadler introduce a third party into the mechanism;
this will, in the present paper, simply be assumed to be too costly. Likewise,
Demski and Sappington’s solution to the double moral hazard problem hinges
on the assumptions that the manager is not wealth-constrained (he can buy
the whole project), and that the parties can commit to not reneging on the
initial contract (when this is in their mutual interest); neither of these two
assumptions will be made below.
In the other strand of literature, which analyzes actual situations of dou-
ble moral hazard, the article by Baiman and Rajan [2] is closely related to
the present. They analyze whether capital investment decisions should be
made by central or local management, and view this question as linked to the
issue of the incentive scheme of local management. They stress that both cen-
tral management (the owner) and local management may make choices that
are distorted from the point of view of the organization’s objectives; in their
model, the problem with owner-control is lack of commitment, which leads to
hold-up: the local manager invests resources in acquiring knowledge about a
projects’ profitability, and because the owner cannot commit to rewarding the
local manager as a function of the information provided, the owner may be
free to choose projects that yield little reward (quasi-rents) to the manager4.
Since this lowers the manager’s eﬀort in acquiring knowledge about a projects’
profitability, the owner may prefer to delegate the choice of project to the
manager. On the other hand, if the choice is delegated to the manager, the
manager earns informational rent. In contrast, the present article assumes no
firm-specific investment or hold-up; in this sense, the present model is simpler5.
The relationship between the present analysis and Milgrom and Holm-
strøm’s multi-task principal-agent theory [15] should also be mentioned. Mil-
grom and Holmstrøm show that if p is not well governed by a given performance
measure (as in the example mentioned above where management inflates short
run performance at the expense of long-term reputation), then establishing
high-powered incentives to increase eﬀort may be undesirable, because of the
distortionary eﬀect on the other decision. Milgrom and Holmstrøm argue that
the Principal may then monitor the Agent instead, and they suggest this as
an explanation why centralized control and low powered incentives go together
4The same point is made by Aghion and Tirole [1].
5See also Romano [19] for an analysis of a double moral hazard in a wholesaler-retailer
relationship.
7in the conventional employment contract. As such, the Milgrom-Holmstrøm
theory lends support to the view that delegation and incentives are comple-
mentary. In contrast, the present article suggests that when p is centralized, it
may be possible to maintain high-powered incentives; i.e. that centralization
may be a prerequisite for the use of high-powered incentives.
Finally, a set of empirical papers analyze whether incentives and delegation
go together in reality (e.g. Prendergast[18] and Nagar [17]). Interestingly, this
literature often does not find there to be complementarity between delegation
and incentives. Thus, Nagar writes (p.380):
‘On the other hand, in contrast with principal-agent theory, I find
no evidence that the extent of incentive compensation plays a sig-
nificant role in explaining the extent of delegation’.
This lack of evidence lends support to the main argument of this paper,
which means that the lack of evidence should hence not be seen as incompatible
with Principal-Agent theory.
The following sections introduce and analyze the model. In the main part
of the analysis, only the Agent’s ex-ante participation constraint will play a
role, but the issue will also be analyzed, in a separate section, whether the
ex-post participation constraint can be used strategically as a commitment
device for the Principal.
The Model
Consider as the Principal a risk-neutral owner, who proposes an incentive
scheme to the Agent, a risk-averse manager, whose eﬀort level a is unobservable
to the owner6. Assume that the cost of eﬀort to the manager is C(a) = a2/2.
The performance of the manager is measured by the profitability x, which is
verifiable to a court. Profits depend on the eﬀort a and on a random component
pθ:
x = a+ pθ
where p is an index of the degree of the riskiness of the project, and θ ∼ N(k, 1),
where k > 0 is the expected reward from taking risk. p is assumed to take
values in the interval [0, 1]. When delegated, p is chosen by the manager, while
6It is assumed that the central manager cannot undertake the eﬀort herself due to the
time-constraint.
8when centralized, it is chosen by the owner. As is the case with a, throughout
most of the analysis p will be assumed to be unobservable. However, the case
where p is observable but not verifiable will be analyzed in a section below,
which analyzes the strategic use of the ex-post participation constraint.
As an assumption that will be discussed below, the incentive scheme which
links the manager’s pay, w, to performance, x, is linear7:
w = α+ βx
where α is the base salary and β is the power of the incentive scheme. Fur-
thermore, the manager’s utility-function is exponential:
UA = −e−(w−c(a))
and the manager’ reservation certainty equivalent is dCE.
The game is assumed to be the following:
1. The owner and the manager write a contract in which both decision
rights and the parameters of the incentive scheme, α and β, are fixed. It
is assumed that the owner has all the bargaining power8.
2. The choices of a and p are carried out simultaneously, and will be deter-
mined in a Nash-equilibrium9.
3. x is realized and w is paid by the owner to the manager as a function of
x.
To simplify the owner’s maximization problem, it is worth deriving the
manager’s certainty equivalent, since this determines how much the owner
needs to pay the manager: The manager receives the uncertain or stochastic
income w = α+β(a+pθ), which is normally distributed with mean α+βa+βpk
and variance equal to β2p2. Given that his utility function is UA = −e−(w−c(a)),
7This assumption will be discussed below.
8But in this model, this is only a question of the size of the manager’s reservation certainty
equivalent; more bargaining power to the manager has the same implications as an increase
in his reservation utility.
9In the present model, it will follow from the independence of a from p, that the Stack-
elberg equilibrium yields the same outcome as the Nash equilibrium.
9the certainty equivalent (CE) of the normally distributed random variable can
be expressed as,
CE = α+ βE(x)− β2p2/2− C(a)
as first shown by Milgrom and Holmstrøm [15].
Given that the owner has all the bargaining power, the manager’s certainty
equivalent will be equal to his reservation certainty equivalent dCE, from which
the base salary α can be calculated as:
α = dCE − βE(x) + β2p2/2 + C(a)
The owner maximizes expected net profits E(x − w), which rewritten equals
(1− β)E(x)− α, since E(w) = α+ βE(x). Using the expression for α above,
net profits, (1− β)E(x)− α, hence equal
(1− β)E(x)− dCE + βE(x)− β2p2/2− C(a) = E(x)− dCE − β2p2/2− C(a)
Since dCE is a constant and E(x) = a + pk, it follows that the owner’s maxi-
mization problem can be written as
Maxβ,α,a,p : a+ pk − β2p2/2− C(a)
subject to the IC-constraints. In the following, let C(a) = a
2
2
.
First, it is useful first to analyze what level of p would be decided on if p
were contractible, i.e. to establish the second-best outcome.
The Benchmark Case Where p Is Contractible
If the owner could commit to some level of p, she would solve the following
maximization problem:
Maxβ,α,p : a+ pk − β2p2/2−
a2
2
s.t.
C 0(a) = β
Maximizing the Lagrangian, one obtains the condition for an inner maxi-
mum of p :
poptimal = k/a
2
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From the second-order condition, it can be verified that the second-best
level for p equals min{1, k/a2} .
Let us now consider the three insights mentioned in the introduction, that
structure the analysis.
Externalities Arise Both under Delegation and Under Central-
ization
It will now be shown that under delegation, the manager will, given the
level of a, tend to choose p too low (take on too much risk), while under
centralization, the owner will take too much risk.
To see this, note that when the manager chooses a and p given α and β,
he maximizes the certainty equivalent:
CE = α+ βE(x)− β2p2/2− a
2
2
= α+ β(a+ pk)− β2p2/2− a
2
2
which yields the first-order conditions:
a = β
p = k/β when k/β < 1
p = 1 when k/β = 1
Thus, under delegation,
p = min {k/a, 1}
Under centralization, when the owner chooses p after the manager’s incentive
contract has been signed, the owner maximizes (1−β)a−α+(1−β)pk, which
means that she sets p equal to 1. The owner will take the full risk. So, if
pd denotes the manager’s choice under delegation and pc denotes the owner’s
choice under centralization,
pd ≤ poptimal ≤ pc = 1
since k/a2 > k/a when 0 < a < 1 (and a > 1 will not be optimal since
marginal cost of eﬀort which equals a is higher than marginal productivity
which equals 1, when a > 1), and since k/a2 < 1 when k < a2.
The result that the manager will take too little risk and the owner too
much risk is not surprising: when the decision is delegated to the manager,
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he will lower the risk imposed on him by the incentive scheme, and does not
internalize the full cost of lowering the risk, since he only receives the fraction
β of profits. On the other hand, when p is centralized, the owner will disregard
the interests of the manager, and will therefore impose the full risk on him.
The optimal committed chocie of p, poptimal, strikes a middle ground between
these two distorted choices.
Both Externalities May Be Exacerbated by an Increase in the
Power of Incentives
This follows from the fact that both the distance between pd and poptimal
and the distance between poptimal and pc may be increasing in a. Thus, the
diﬀerence between pd and poptimal is ka −
k
a2
, when solutions are interior, and
this diﬀerence is increasing in a when a ≤ 1, and the diﬀerence between poptimal
and pc = 1 is also increasing in a when the optimal solution is interior, since
k
a
is decreasing in a. In the case of delegation, when incentives are increased
(when β and hence a is increased), the manager protects himself against risk by
lowering pd. Note that while this is itself costly for the owner, it has the positive
consequence that the cost to the manager of the higher powered incentives is
lowered, which means that the fixed salary to the manager can be lowered. In
the case of centralization, when the power of incentives increases, the optimal
level of p may fall (when the solutions is interior) because the cost to the
manager of risky projects increases. However, the owner cannot commit to
choosing a lower p, and will hence impose a high cost on the manager, who
will require compensation for this ex-ante.
It remains to be shown that which of these increased externalities is more
serious depends on the parameters of the situation, in this case on the reward
for taking risk, k.
Which Externality is More Costly Depends on k
This can be seen from the proof of the following propositions, that are
central to this article:
Proposition 1 For low values of k, delegation is optimal and incentives are
higher under delegation than under centralization.
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Proof: When p is delegated, the owner’s maximization problem is:
Maxβ,α,a,p : a+ pk − β2p2/2− a2/2
s.t.
a = β
p = k/β when k/β < 1
p = 1 when k/β = 1
The problem can be rewritten
Max (a+ pk − 1
2
a2p2 − a2/2) (1)
s.t.
p = min {k/a, 1}
Wd (a) — the utility for the owner under delegation— is then given by
Wd(a) = a+ k
2/a− 1
2
k2 − a2/2 when k/a < 1
Wd(a) = a+ k − a2 when k/a ≥ 1
There are two possibilities:
a) a ∈ [0; k] . Then Wd(a) = a + k − a2. Two possibilities arise; k ≥ 12 or
k < 1
2
. When k ≥ 1
2
and a = 1
2
, the requirement a ≤ k is fulfilled, and since
a + k − a2 is maximized for a = 1
2
, a = 1
2
is a candidate-solution within the
interval [0; k]. Note that Wd(
1
2
) = 1
4
+k.When, as the other possibility, k < 1
2
,
a candidate solution is a = k, given that a ∈ [0; k], since a+k−a2 is increasing
in a in the interval [0; k] . This yields Wd(a) = 2k − k2. So, in the interval a
∈ [0; k] , the candidate solutions yield the utilities:
Wd(
1
2
) =
1
4
+ k when k ≥ 1
2
Wd(k) = 2k − k2 when k <
1
2
These utilities must be compared to the maximal utilities obtained when a > k.
In this case, p = k/a under delegation and Wd(a) = a + k
2/a − 1
2
k2 − a2/2.
DerivingWd(a) with respect to a and setting equal to zero yields the condition:
1− k
2
a2
− a = 0⇒ k2 = a2 − a3 =⇒ k = (a2 − a3)0.5
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The points (a, k) that fulfill this equation are potential candidates for an inner
optimum.
Graphically, the candidate-points (a, k) are as shown on Figure 1 :
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Figure 1
Note that the condition a > k is fulfilled for all the points on the graph
except origo. The function (a2 − a3)0.5 is maximized for a = 2/3, at which
point k = .38. Thus, for k > .38, there is no inner optimum for k. This means
that when k > .38, there is no candidate for a solution within the open interval
a > k. When, on the other hand, k < .38, for each k on the y-axis, there are
two values of a, a higher and a lower, that may represent the maximum. By
inserting k = (a2 − a3) 12 into the expression Wd(a) = a + k
2
a
− k2
2
− a2
2
, one
obtains,
Wd(a) = a+ (a
2 − a3)/a− (a2 − a3)/2− a2/2
which is shown on Figure 2.
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From the two figures, it is possible to find the highest attainable utility in
the set a > k. Given some value k < 0.38, one finds the two possible inner
optima from Figure 1, and from Figure 2, one finds out whether it is the lower
or the higher value of a, which yields the higher utility for P.
We now compare this highest utility with that under centralization,Wc(a).
Under centralization, the maximization problem can be written:
Maxβ,α,a,p : a+ pk − β2p2/2−
a2
2
s.t.
a = β
p = 1
By inserting the IC-constraint into the criterion function, a+pk−β2p2/2− a2
2
,
one obtains:
Wc(a) = a+ k − a2
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Diﬀerentiating Wc(a) with respect to a and setting equal to zero yields10:
a = 1
2
. Hence, β = C 0(1
2
) = 1
2
, and Wc(
1
2
) = 1
4
+ k.
To see that for low values of k, delegation may be optimal and may be
associated with higher β and hence higher a than centralization, consider the
interval where k ∈ [0; 0.2]. There are two cases to consider under delegation:
a) a ≤ k: In this case, since k < 1
2
, the maximal utility is obtained for
a = k and equals 2k − k2. Since 2k − k2 is increasing in the interval [0; 0.2],
the maximal value is no higher than 0.4− 0.04 = 0.36.
b) a > k: It can be seen from Figure 1 and Figure 2 that among the two
optima in the interval a > k, it is the higher value of a which maximizes utility.
Thus, when e.g. k = 0.2, the solution to the equation 0.2 = (a2−a3) 12 is either
a = . 23 or a = . 96, and as is clear from Figure 2, utility is higher when a = .
96 than when a = . 2311. Note also from Figure 1 that the higher value of a is
greater than 1
2
which is the optimal a under centralization. From Figure 2 it
is clear that Wd is higher than 0.36 for the higher value of a, since Wd = . 5,
for a = 1.
Under centralization, a = 1
2
and maximal utility is 1
4
+ k which is lower
than the maximal utility under delegation for all values of k, since . 5 > .45.
QED.
Proposition 2 There exists an interval for intermediate values of k for which
centralization is preferable to delegation, and for which incentives are higher
under centralization than under delegation.
Proof: Take the interval k ∈
i
0.39; 1
2
h
. Under delegation there exists no
inner optimum for a > k, as can be seen from Figure 1. Thus, since k < 1
2
, the
optimum under delegation is a = k and Wd = 2k − k2. a is then lower under
delegation than under centralization (where a = 1
2
),and since 2k − k2 < k + 1
4
when k ∈
i
0.39; 1
2
h
, centralization is preferable to decentralization.
QED
The intuition is as follows: Under delegation, the manager will choose a low
p in order to avoid risk, and while this problem is exacerbated by high-powered
incentives (high β and hence high a), the low value of p means that high
10The more general expression is the well-known : β = 11+C00(a) , see e.g. Milgrom and
Roberts.
11This can also be verified directly: Wd(. 96) = . 52, while Wd(.23) = . 36.
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powered incentives impose little risk on the manager. Thus, under delegation
the manager can lower the cost of high powered incentives through the choice
of p, and when k is low, this costs the owner little in terms of a lower expected
return. However, when k is higher, this cost of not taking risk is higher, and
so the manager’s ability to protect himself against risk becomes an argument
not for (as when k is low) but against introducing a high-powered scheme.
Or, in other words, when the power of incentives when incentives increase,
the externality which the two impose on each other also increases both under
delegation and under centralization, but when k is high (low) the increased
externality which the manager imposes on the owner under delegation is more
(less) costly than the increased externality that the owner imposes on the
manager under centralization.
Finally, contrast these two propositions with the two claims by Milgrom
and Roberts quoted in the introduction. The first claim was that there will be
more delegation when the possibility of introducing an incentive-scheme arises.
It follows from the second proposition above that the answer is: not necessar-
ily. When β is zero, delegation and centralization yield the same utility for
the owner, while when β can be set freely, centralization will be preferable
to delegation when k is suﬃciently high. This is the case where an incentive
scheme can be eﬃciently employed under centralization whereas, under del-
egation, incentives induce too little risk-taking. The second claim was that
delegation implies more high-powered incentives. And again, the answer is
that while that may be the case (when k is low), it is not necessarily true.
As stated above, for intermediate values of k, incentives may be higher under
centralization than under delegation.
Strategic Use of the Ex-post Participation Constraint
In the analysis above, it was assumed that p was not observable to A, who
could then not leave as a reaction to the P ’s choice of p. However, it may be
argued that p is often observable to A, and that observability opens up the pos-
sibility of using the ex-post participation constraint stratetigically. The idea is
that when p is observable to A, P may in her choice of p be restricted by A’s
threat of leaving. While it is true that, in the analysis above, the agent’s par-
ticipation constraint holds when P chooses p = 1, since A realizes ex-ante that
P will choose p = 1, and hence requires a high α to compensate for this, the
possibility exists that something better can be achieved under centralization if
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A’s participation constraint is used as a way for P to commit not to choose p
too high12. It may even be possible to manipulate A’s participation constraint
by paying A part of his fixed salary during or before the period in which A
exercises eﬀort and P chooses p. This may lower A’s tolerance of P ’s choice of
p, since A will then not fear losing all of the fixed salary for the given period
by leaving in the middle of it. It will now be shown that this is, at least in
theory, a forceful device. It may be possible hereby to achieve the second-best
outcome, i.e. the outcome which maximizes P ’s utility subject only to A’s
incentive constraint. To see this, let the second-best level of a equal a∗, and
note that the second-best level of p is given as min {1, k/(a∗)2}, as derived
above. A’s ex-post incentive constraint is then:
α1 + a∗(a∗ + pk)− (a∗)2p2/2− a2/2 = dCE
where β = a∗ has been inserted. If α1 is set as that value which ensures
that the equality holds when p = min {1, k/(a∗)2}, the question is whether P
will choose p = min {1, k/(a∗)2}. It is clear that P will choose the highest
possible p, so the crucial question is whether A’s utility is decreasing for p ≥
k/(a∗)2 when k/(a∗)2 < 1. If so, P cannot choose a higher level of p, since the
participation constraint is then exactly fulfilled for p = k/(a∗)2, and for higher
values of p, A’s utility will be lower, inducing him to leave. The derivative
of A’s utility with respect to p is a∗k − (a∗)2p, which is negative when p >
k/a∗. However, when p = min {1, k/(a∗)2}, p will in fact be greater than k/a∗,
since a∗ < 1 (the marginal productivity equals the marginal cost at a = 1,
and the fact that incentives can only be created through imposing risk on A
means that it is preferable to set a lower than 1). This reveals that the ex-
post participation constraint may conceivably be used as a way of ensuring the
second-best outcome.
The strategic use of A’s participation constraint, and the possibility of ma-
nipulating it by timing salary-payments (which must be done without risking
that A leaves the relationship after receiving part of the salary) only re-inforces
the point made in this paper, since it strengthens the case for centralization.
When P can commit through A’s participation constraint, this adds a reason
why centralization may go together with high-powered incentives.
Discussion
12As when an employer is restrained in the exercise of authority by the fear that employees
will leave.
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One of the model’s assumptions is worth mentioning in particular, namely
the linearity of the the incentive scheme. It is well-known that a linear incen-
tive scheme is optimal when the utility-function is the one assumed (the neg-
ative exponential function), and a is the only action (see Milgrom-Holmstrøm
[15]). But the linear scheme may not be optimal under centralization when
both A and P make decisions13, and it may not be optimal when A choose both
a and p, and when p aﬀects the variance of the performance measure. When
the Agent’s risk-aversion is at the root of the distortion under delegation, it
may be optimal to induce the Agent to take risks by oﬀering a non-linear
scheme, e.g. by oﬀering a bonus- or an option-scheme.
However, in defense of the linear scheme, it should be noted that it is robust
over time, leading the Agent neither to relax when the target is met or when
the target becomes unreachable. In a dynamic setting, the optimal scheme
may for this reason be close to linear to keep a constant intensity over time14.
Furthermore, as mentioned, the main purpose of this paper is to suggest a
view of the relationship between delegation and incentives which qualifies the
intuition that delegation and incentives are always complementary, and this
view may be presented without fully endogenizing the incentive scheme15.
Conclusion
This article argues that delegation and higher powered incentives do not
always go together, i.e. that the general claim of complementarity does not
hold. This was illustrated in a counter-example in which one decision (eﬀort)
could only be taken by the Agent, while the other decision, the choice of
project, could be taken by either the Principal or the Agent. Given diﬀerent
preferences with respect to risk, it was established that:
• When an incentive scheme is introduced, or made steeper, it may be
optimal to centralize project choice at the same time.
13See Kim and Wang [8].
14An option scheme may also be excluded if it is perceived to provide too strong an
incentive for the Agent to distort the performance measure, e.g. accounting profits.
15Also, in a former version of this paper (Lando [9]), examples were constructed where
delegation and incentives were not complementary, and in these examples, no restriction
was made to linear schemes.
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• When the Principal delegates the decision concerning project choice, it
may be optimal for her to lower the power of incentives at the same time.
This example illustrates a general reason why delegation and incentives may
not be complementary: higher incentives may increase not only the externality
which the Principal imposes on the Agent, but also the externality which
the Agent imposes on the Principal, when one performance measure cannot
adequately control two decisions by the Agent.
Moreover, when the Agent’s threat to leave can be used to constrain the
Principal in her exercise of authority16, this was shown to render the second-
best outcome achievable under centralization. This provides a further reason
why strong incentives for the Agent may be compatible with centralization of
certain decisions.
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